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I. Introduction
Dmitri Medvedev was elected president of the Russian Federation on March 2, 2008.
On May 8, 2008, the new president appointed Vladimir Putin as Chairman of the Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation, frequently called the Prime Minister. The Russian
Constitution provides for the president to serve a term of four years.'
While serving as president, Putin had strongly affirmed that there should be no changes
in the constitution. But on November 11, 2008, President Medvedev proposed extending
the presidential term to six years and the term of members of the State Duma from four to
five years to ensure that the members of the Duma "have enough time to put their
promises into practice between elections."2 The amendments were adopted by special
majorities of both the Duma and the Federation Council less than three weeks after their
proposal. 3 They were then submitted as required by the Constitution for ratification by
"not less than two-thirds of the subjects [political components] of the Russian Federa-
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1. "(1) Citizens of the R.F. select the President of the R. F. for four years on the basis of a general, equal
and direct electoral law by secret ballot .... (3) The same person may not occupy the position of President of
the R.F. for more than two terms in succession." Konstitutsia Rossiskoi Federatsii [Konst. R.F.] [Constitu-
tion] ch. 4, art. 81 (Russ.).
2. Philip P. Pan, Putin's Intentions Debated After Shift on 4-Year Term, WASit. PosT, Nov. 28, 2008, at A12.
Konst. R.F. ch. 5, art. 94 provides that "the representative and legislative body of the R.F. shall be the Federal
Assembly-the parliament of the R.F." which, under art. 95(1) "is composed of a Federal Council and State
Duma." Under art. 96(1), "the State Duma shall be elected for a term of five years." Konst. R.F. ch. 5, art.
94, 95(1), 96(1).
3. Issues covered by the R.F. Constitution are treated separately as "federal constitutional legislation"
requiring approval by three-fourths of the members of the Federal Council and by two-thirds of the members
of the State Duma. Konst. R.F. ch. 5, art. 108(1) and (2).
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tion."4 This amendment was accomplished over the opposition of only the Communist
members of the Duma and representatives of the remnants of the liberal parties. Specula-
tion followed that these amendments foretold a possible return of Putin to the presidency,
either at the end of Medvedev's presidency in 2012, or upon the resignation of Medvedev.
In his campaign for the presidency, Medvedev, a graduate and former member of the St.
Petersburg University Faculty of Law, declared that a major goal of his administration
would be judicial reform and elimination of corruption in the courts and government
administration. While campaigning, he called Russia "a country of legal nihilism" with a
"disregard for the law."5
After election in July, Medvedev established a council that issued a national plan against
corruption. The plan outlined proposals: (1) to impose personal responsibility on state
officers for corruption-related crimes of subservient officers; (2) regulatory measures for
state contracts and removal of government officials from boards of directors of state cor-
porations; and (3) education of citizens in the legal regulation of corrupt activities, pre-
sumably meaning bribery. A report of Transparency International found Russia to be
number 147 among 180 countries relating to the degree of corruption. 6
On October 3, Medvedev submitted to the Duma a proposed law "On the Counterac-
tion to Corruption" accompanied by three bills amending existing legislation regulating
activities of government agencies, the police, and the courts. The State Duma adopted
this package of legislation at its second reading on December 17 after the President suc-
ceeded in blocking efforts of some members and civil servants to postpone the effective
date until January 1, 2010. 7
On December 22, 2008, the Russian Federation Council approved this legislation
amending more than twenty federal laws including the civil, criminal, and labor codes. 8
The legislation also implemented the United Nations Convention against Corruption of
October 31, 2003, which Russia had ratified on May 6, 2006. The new anti-corruption
laws require state officials to declare their income and property and the income and prop-
erty of their spouse and minor children. The laws also expand the definition of corruption
to include active and passive bribery as well as trading in "influence." Article 575 of the
4. Konst. R.F. ch. 9 regulates amendments of the Constitution. Amendments of Chapters 1, 2 and 9
concerning basic constitutional structure and rights of citizens require approval by three-fifths of the Federal
Assembly and a special Constitutional Assembly or national referendum. Amendment of other chapters such
as those regulating the terms of office follow the format described in the text above. See Konst. R.F. ch. 9.
5. Natalya Krainova, Medvedev Orders Cleanup of Corts, Moscow TIMES, May 21, 2008, available at www.
cdi.org/Russia/Johnson/2008- 1 00-cfm.
6. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL BANGLADESH, CORRUPnONS PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI) 2008,
(2008), http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/CPI/CPI2008/CPI2008-Results-FAQ.pdf.
7. Lyudmila Alexandrova, President Upsets Duma Attempts to Postpone Anti-corruption Laws, ITAR-TAss,
Dec. 17, 2008.
8. Federal Law No 273-FZ, On Counteraction to Corruption; Federal Law No. 274-FZ, On Amend-
ments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal
Law on Counteraction to Corruption; Federal Law No. 280-FZ, On Amendments to Certain Legislative
Acts of the Russian Federation in Relation to Ratification of the UN Anti-bribery Convention of October 31,
2003 and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption ofJanuary 27, 1999 and Adoption of the Federal Law
On Counteraction to Corruption; Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives, Russia, BUSINESS AvrICORRUPnON
PORTAL, available at www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/europe-central-asia/russia/initia-
tives; Federation Council Approves Anti-Corruption Laws, ITAR-TASS, Moscow, Dec. 22, 2008; J. Vermin, Dis-
illusion is a Virtue, Jan. 12 2009, www.russianlawonline.com/contentlanti-corruption-legislation-russia.
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Civil Code is amended to prohibit any gift to a public official with a value exceeding 3000
rubles (approximately US$90). This is inconsistent with certain laws prohibiting public
officials from accepting any gifts unless they are made at open formal occasions where-
upon the gifts become state or municipal property. 9
On December 2 at the seventh All-Russian Congress of Judges, Medvedev proposed a
federal law to reform the judicial system.' 0 His legislation provided for a single discipli-
nary body to supervise judges, simplify procedures to appointment judges, and improve
the quality of legal education. One stated purpose of the reform would be to reduce the
number of appeals of Russian citizens from decisions of Russian courts to the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.II Russia ratified the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1991. As a result
of Protocol No. 11 (which was ratified effective November 1, 1998, when Boris Yeltsin
was president), the Convention requires parties to the Protocol to permit persons claiming
abuse by courts of certain procedural and substantive rights to appeal to the Strasbourg
court. At the end of 2008, the number of cases filed against Russia had risen to twenty-
eight percent of the total, far more than any other country and out of proportion to the
population. 12
H. New Law on Foreign Investment in Strategic Enterprises
One of Vladimir Putin's last acts in his capacity as Russia's president was to sign into
law, on April 29, 2008, a new federal statute requiring foreign investors wishing to acquire
a substantial stake in "strategically significant" enterprises in Russia to seek advance gov-
ernment approval for any such acquisition.1 The law has been criticized as likely to have
a chilling effect on already-wary foreign investors and further amplify the Russian Gov-
ernment's power to control economic activity for political ends. 14
Defenders of the law point out that many, if not most, countries have adopted some
measures to restrict foreign investors' acquisition rights in certain strategically vital
spheres of economic activity.' 5 The United States, for instance, has maintained, since
1988, its own governmental review procedure for foreign investments affecting national
security interests, under the so-called "Exon-Florio" provisions, 16 and has recently en-
9. See Vermin, Disillusion is a Virtue, supra note 8.
10. Russia's Medvedev Proposes Transparency for Courts, RIA NovosTi, Dec. 2, 2008, available at http://www.
cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-218-1 .cfm.
11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 1955
U.N.T.S. 220 (no. 2889), amended by Protocol No. 11, E.T.S. No. 155, eff. Nov. 1, 1998.
12. Clifford J. Levy, European Court Seems to Rankle Kremlin, N.Y. TimES, Mar. 29, 2009, available at www.
nytimes.corn/2009/03/29/world/europe/29russia.html?_r=3 &hp&adxhnlx= 12.
13. On the order of making foreign investments in commercial enterprises having strategic importance for
national security of the Russian Federation. Foreign Investment in Companies of Strategic Significance for
National Defense and Security No.57-F3, Ros. GAZ. May 7, 2008 [hereinafter FISEL] available at www.rg.ru/
2008/05/07/investicii-fz-dok.html.
14. See, e.g., Natalya Alyakrinskaya, New Bill Bars Foreigners from Strategic Sectors, Moscow NEWS, Aug.
16, 2007, available at www.mnweekly.ru/business/20070816/55268300.htinl.
15. See, e.g., Jesse Heath, Strategic Protectionism? National Security and Foreign Investment in the Russian Fed-
eration, GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract-id=1264041.
16. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2007) (Exon-Florio); 31 C.F.R. § 800.503 (2008).
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acted amendments to the procedure designed to expand the scope of this review.' 7 In-
deed, the official Explanatory Note to Russia's Foreign Investment in Strategic
Enterprises Law (FISEL) expressly refers to the "analogous" nature of the U.S. legisla-
tion.18 In assessing the features and likely impact of the new Russian law, it might there-
fore be instructive, particularly for U.S.-based observers, to compare its provisions and
their implementation to those of Exon-Florio.
Both Russia's FISEL and the United States' Exon-Florio provisions permit their re-
spective governments to reject foreign investment transactions deemed to threaten na-
tional security interests.19 There are quite a few significant differences, however, in how
the two laws are structured.
Compared to Exon-Florio, the FISEL is relatively explicit and precise regarding its
scope of application. In broad terms, it requires all foreign investors acquiring shares and/
or control-a concept defined in substantial detail of more than fifty percent of a company
operating within the sectors of economic activity listed in the law to obtain advance gov-
ernment approval before proceeding with the investment.20 The threshold is lower if the
foreign entity is state-owned (twenty-five percent), or if the entity being acquired is in the
business of extraction or exploration of strategic natural resources (ten percent).21 Fur-
thermore, would-be acquirers of over five percent of a company within any of the strategic
sectors are subject to a notification requirement. 22 The law lists forty-two categories of
strategic activities, which with a few exceptions fall into the military, nuclear, aerospace,
natural resources, and natural monopoly spheres. Some of the other types of companies
covered by the law include large mass media companies and telecommunications
companies.
Exon-Florio, in contrast, does not define the industries or types of acquisitions that are
subject to the law. Rather it authorizes the president to review, suspend, and prohibit any
foreign investment transactions that could constitute a threat to "national security." 23
Unlike its Russian counterpart, however, Exon-Florio contains no mandatory pre-ap-
proval or notification procedure. Notification under the U.S. law is voluntary, but be-
cause the president can also reject transactions where notice was not given, there is a
significant incentive to provide timely notice. 24
Review under both the United States and Russian legislation is a multi-step procedure
designed to collect relevant information to determine whether the transaction should pro-
ceed. Under Exon-Florio, ultimate decision-making authority with regard to a given in-
vestment rests with the president, who has delegated the task of reviewing and making
17. See Comm. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U. S., EXON-FLoRIO PROVISION (CFIUS), available at www.
ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/ [hereinafter CFIUS].
18. Explanatory Note on Federal Law, On the Order of Making Foreign Investments in Commercial En-
terprises Having Strategic Importance for National Security of the Russian Federation, bttp://base.conultant.
ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=PRJ;n=53144.
19. See FISEL, supra note 13, at art. 10; CFIUS Note, supra note 17.
20. FISEL, supra note 13, at arts. 2, 3, 5.
21. Id.
22. Id. art. 14.
23. CFIUS Note, supra note 17.
24. See, e.g., U.S. GOVT AccOuNrAILITy OFF., GAO 05-686, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF ExON-FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE LAW'S ENFORCEMENT (2005) available at www.gao.gov/
new.items/d05686.pdf.
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preliminary recommendations to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS), which is composed of senior government officials including the U.S. Sec-
retaries of Treasury, Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State, Energy, and the At-
torney General.25 CFIUS has thirty days to review a transaction to determine whether it
warrants a further forty-five day intensive review, and must thereafter make a recommen-
dation to the president regarding approval or rejection. The president then has fifteen
days to decide whether to prohibit a transaction and must report to congress regarding his
decision.26
The review procedure spelled out under FISEL is substantially more detailed but, in
broad terms, is similar to the procedures of Exon-Florio. As a first step, the foreign inves-
tor must submit extensive documentation relating to the intended acquisition to the Fed-
eral Anti-Monopoly Service (FAS), which then conducts an investigation of the facts in
conjunction with the Federal Security Service (FSB).27 The FAS must then file its report
and preliminary recommendation with a special commission, composed of deputy Prime
Ministers and heads of various state agencies with competence in security and economic
matters.28 The commission is chaired by the Prime Minister and decides whether to ap-
prove the investment by a majority vote.29 The entire review process is supposed to take
three, or, in some cases, six months, which is roughly comparable to the length of review
under Exon-Florio.
With regard to the substantive standard used to approve or reject a transaction, both the
FISEL and Exon-Florio use "threat to national security" as the operative inquiry. The
U.S. law is substantially more specific, requiring the president to find "credible evidence"
that "the foreign entity exercising control might take action that threatens national secur-
ity" and that other provisions of law do not adequately and appropriately enable him oth-
erwise to protect the national security in the matter.30 While Exon-Florio contains no
definition of what constitutes a threat to national security it does contain a list of factors to
be considered by the reviewing authority in making the determination. The relevant fac-
tors under Exon-Florio involve consideration of national defense requirements, mainte-
nance of U.S. technological leadership in defense-related fields, risk of undesirable
weapons proliferation to supporters of terrorism or countries that pose a potential military
threat to the United States, and effects on critical technology, infrastructure, and energy
security.31
Superficially, it appears that FISEL also includes a list of elements to be considered.
Thus, under Article 10(1), the FAS is tasked with determining whether the enterprise
conducts specially licensed activities, has access to state secrets, deals in transactions in-
volving controlled products and technologies, or has rights to conduct international trans-
actions in the field of military equipment. 32 Many elements however appear designed to
25. CFIUS Note, supra note 17.
26. Id.
27. FISEL, supra note 13, arts. 8-9; Heath, supra note 15, at 28-30.
28. FISEL, supra note 13, at art. 9(1); On the Governmental Commission for Control over the Making of
Foreign Investments in the Russian Federation [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2008, No.
510, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/law/9644.shtml.
29. Government Commission No. 510, supra note 28, at art. 9.
30. CFIUS Note, supra note 17.
31. See id.
32. FISEL, supra note 13, at art. 10.
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establish that the enterprise actually falls into one or more of the forty-two sectors defined
in the law as strategic. For instance, one of the thirteen inquiries listed in Article 10(1) is
whether an enterprise appears on the FAS list of natural monopolies. 33 Yet, an enterprise's
status as a natural monopoly triggers mandatory FISEL review by definition, 34 so the
inquiry under Article 10(1) does not help to determine whether a prospective acquisition
of rights should be approved or rejected. It appears that FISEL contains little guidance in
determining when a prospective acquisition should be approved or rejected.
The effect of a law depends on how it is implemented. It is difficult to predict whether
FISEL will have a similar effect as Exon-Florio in the United States. Despite thousands
of notified transactions, a U.S. president has only once exercised his power to reject a
foreign investment transaction under Exon-Florio.35 But it is likely that the possibility of
rejection has deterred some acquisitions. It is similarly possible that the added uncertainty
regarding the new review procedure would make foreign investors marginally less inclined
to proceed with new investments in Russia in the forty-two sectors identified in the
FISEL. On the other hand, it could be argued that even absent any investment notifica-
tion procedure, a foreign investor seeking to acquire a stake in a strategic enterprise in
Russia would be well advised to investigate whether the acquisition is likely to meet with
the government's approval. Under this view, the approval procedure might actually de-
crease a foreign investor's uncertainty as to whether its investment is welcomed by the
authorities. 36
It is too early to tell whether the new law will increase the protection of domestic indus-
tries from foreign ownership or merely streamline and centralize decision-making about
important foreign investments in Russia's economy. The potential for discriminatory or
unjustified application of the vague "threat to national security" standard to screen out
undesirable investments is a worrisome possibility. But as the recent unwinding of a
Dubai company's deal to operate several U.S. port terminals in the United States
powerfully illustrates, sufficient political opposition is usually enough to block an undesir-
able foreign acquisition, regardless of whether the law is clear in authorizing such an
outcome.
37
Only two transactions have been reviewed so far by the Russian authorities under
FISEL. One involved a share acquisition in the diamond industry by DeBeers and the
other a partial acquisition of an aviation enterprise by Alenia Aeronautica. 3s The recently
constituted FISEL Commission approved both of these transactions within a relatively
short timeframe. 39 Moreover, one member of the commission, first deputy Prime Minis-
ter Igor Shuvalov, publicly stated that the goal of the commission is the approval, rather
than the restriction, of investments. 40 With the recent capital flight from Russia and the
33. Id.
34. Id. art. 6(36).
35. See Ronald D. Lee & Nancy Perkins, Securing U.S. Strategic Assets: Does The Fron-Florio Statute Do Its
Job?, CHINA TRADF L. REP., Apr. 2006, at 3, available at www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Secur-
ingUSStrategic.pdf.
36. See Heath, supra note 15, at 46.
37. See Lee, supra note 35, at 6.
38. See Yevgenia Written & Ulyana Gorbolskaya, First Deals are Approved, VEDOMOSTl, October 13, 2008,
available at www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/l 0/13/164435.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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international financial crisis, Russia can hardly afford to upset the few foreign investors
willing to make acquisitions. 41 There is no guarantee that this outlook will always prevail,
and so it remains to be seen whether FISEL will be applied in a less benign fashion.
IMl. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Russia and Ukraine
As Russian and CIS companies expand their reach beyond their countries' respective
borders, and as foreign investors continue to undertake projects in the region, the impor-
tance of international arbitration in resolving related commercial and investment disputes
is on the rise. 42 Indeed, even contracts between two CIS entities increasingly contain
international arbitration clauses, presumably due to continuing distrust of the ability of
local court systems to resolve disputes in a speedy, even-handed, and predictable manner.
International arbitration extends the promise of impartial resolution of disputes using
procedures of the parties' own choice, which is a tempting proposition for parties seeking
to reduce the uncertainties of doing business in an unfamiliar or uncertain legal environ-
ment. Bottom-line minded businesspeople, however, often ask whether an international
arbitration award could be enforced and executed effectively in the country in which the
counter-party's assets are located. For those conducting business with Russian and
Ukrainian companies, the issue boils down to whether Russian and Ukrainian courts will
enforce arbitral awards rendered outside of their borders against domestic companies.
The deceptively simple answer is that because both Russia and Ukraine are parties to
the 1958 U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Convention), Russian and Ukrainian courts must enforce international
arbitration awards that do not fall under the list of exceptions to mandatory enforcement
under the convention.4 3
41. Jesse Heath, Alenia Auronautica and Archangel Diamond Corporation's Applications Approved with No
Drama, RUSSIA MoNYrrOR, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.therussiamonitor.blogspot.com/2008/10/alenia-and-
de-beers-applications.html.
42. See, e.g., Richard Chlup, Particularities of Russia-Related International Arbitration, 3 GLOBAL ARB. REV.
24 (2008).
43. Foreign arbitral awards are in a somewhat privileged position because there is no similar agreement to
enforce foreign court decisions, at least as between CIS and Western nations. See, e.g., Sergey Budylin,
Judging the Arbiters: The Enforcement of International Arbitration Decisions in Russia, REv. CENTrRAL & EAST
EUROPEAN L. (Forthcoming 2009). Given that this article uses the New York Convention as a reference
point, it is important to provide a brief overview of the relevant provisions of that treaty. Under Article V(1),
the Convention states that enforcement may be refused only if the party resisting enforcement establishes one
of five specified flaws with the underlying arbitration. Essentially the requesting party must demonstrate that
(1) the arbitration agreement was invalid under the relevant law, (2) the party was not given an opportunity to
present its case, (3) the award goes beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement, (4) there was a flaw in the
composition of the arbitral tribunal or the procedure followed by the tribunal, or (5) that the award has not
become binding or has been properly set aside at the seat of the arbitration or in the country under the law of
which the award had been rendered. In addition, under Article V(2), refusal to enforce an award may be
proper where (1) the subject of the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration as a matter of domestic law, and
(2) recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the country.
Although disagreements as to the scope of these provisions exist, there are certain core principles that enjoy
broad-based, if not universal, support among arbitration scholars and practitioners. First, review of an award
under the New York Convention is not an avenue for reviewing the merits of the dispute, including the
factual and legal conclusions of the tribunal. Second, awards are presumptively valid and the burden is on the
party resisting enforcement to establish its invalidity. Third, exceptions to enforcement, including the public
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The applicability of the New York Convention as a theoretical matter does not fully
address the question of whether Russian or Ukrainian courts will necessarily enforce the
award in accordance with the convention. In both countries, a number of other treaties
and domestic statutes potentially apply to the issue of enforcement of arbitral awards.
Alternatively, courts might simply apply the exceptions to enforcement under the conven-
tion in a broader manner than standard interpretations of the convention would warrant.
Both Russia and Ukraine are parties to other multilateral international agreements on
the subject of enforcement of arbitral awards. All of these agreements post-date the New
York Convention. As a matter of traditional treaty interpretation, these later treaties may
supersede the New York Convention if both are applicable and inconsistent. 44 It is there-
fore crucial to understand how these treaties might affect arbitral awards sought to be
enforced under the New York Convention.
One such treaty is the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
of 1961 (1961 Geneva Convention), 45 an agreement ratified by the Soviet Union and a
number of states in Eastern and Western Europe. As with the New York Convention,
Russia and Ukraine have agreed to be bound by the treaty as successors to the Soviet
Union. While the 1961 Geneva Convention does not deal with the enforcement of arbi-
tral awards, it does deal with the closely related issue of when an award can be set aside,
either at the seat of the arbitration, i.e. in the courts of the country in which the arbitra-
tion took place, or in the country under the law of which the award had been rendered.
Under Article IX(l) of the 1961 Geneva Convention, an award may be set aside only on
one of the following grounds: (1) invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate, (2) lack of an
opportunity to be heard, (3) exercise of jurisdiction in excess of the arbitration agreement,
and (4) the lack of compliance of the arbitration procedure or the selection of arbitrators
with the parties' agreement (or the default rules established in Article lV of the Conven-
tion). These grounds are almost a verbatim repetition of the grounds upon which en-
forcement can be refused under Article V(1)(a)-(d) of the New York Convention and are
therefore consistent with it. Article IX(2) of the 1961 Geneva Convention expressly "lim-
its the application of Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention," which allows a party to
refuse enforcement of an award that has been set aside at the seat of arbitration (or in the
country whose procedural law applied to the arbitration), to cases where it was set aside in
accordance with one of the four grounds stated above. 46 Essentially this provision means
that even an award set aside at the seat of the arbitration may be enforceable in other
states that are parties to the 1961 Geneva Convention, so long as it was not set aside in
accordance with the limits set forth in Article IX(l).
policy exception under Article V(2), should not be interpreted so broadly as to defeat the treaty's objective of
widespread and consistent enforcement of arbitral awards. Fourth, the grounds for refusing recognition or
enforcement of an award listed in the Convention are the only grounds upon which refusal to enforce an
award may be based.
44. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
45. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S.
349 [hereinafter 1961 Geneva Convention].
46. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, art. IX, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S.
364.
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Russia and Ukraine are also parties to the CIS-level 1992 Agreement on the Resolution
of Economic Disputes (1992 Kiev Agreement).47 The 1992 Kiev Agreement provides for
recognition and enforcement of judicial and arbitral awards as between the signatories. 48
Articles 4.3 and 4.4 of the agreement, however, carve out areas in which the jurisdiction of
domestic judicial bodies is exclusive. These exclusions concern disputes related to title to
real property located in the territory of one of the signatories49 and disputes regarding the
legality of official acts or seeking monetary compensation for the consequences of such
acts.50 Although not especially significant exclusions with respect to typical commercial
disputes, these provisions may raise substantial difficulties in the context of investor-state
arbitration, in which the lawfulness of property expropriations or other governmental acts
is usually central to the dispute.
One final point regarding the 1992 Kiev Agreement is that, according to Articles 3 and
7 of the agreement, it applies to the enforcement of decisions of arbitrazh and treteyski
courts. In the CIS context, the term "arbitrazh courts" often refers not to arbitration but
rather to the domestic courts with jurisdiction over commercial disputes. The term
"treteyski" court is a clear reference to arbitration, but is predominantly used for arbitra-
tion before domestic arbitral institutions. It might therefore appear that the 1992 Kiev
Agreement does not expressly reference international arbitration. Any gap in applicability
is largely illusory, at least with regard to Russia and Ukraine.51 Arbitrations that occur at a
CIS international arbitration body, such as the International Commercial Arbitration
Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation (MKAS RF)
or the parallel institution in Ukraine, are enforced under the 1992 Kiev Agreement as a
matter of course. Thus, a Russian court has recently applied the Agreement in enforcing
an international arbitration award rendered in Ukraine.5 2 Notably, the court made no
reference whatsoever to the New York Convention.
The importance of the 1992 Kiev Agreement should not be underestimated even
though it is not applicable to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral proceedings
with a geographical seat outside the CIS, such as most proceedings under the auspices of
non-CIS institutions such as the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) or the London
Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). After all, it is thought that a substantial major-
ity of international arbitrations involving CIS parties take place within the CIS at institu-
tions such as MKAS RF.53
One more international agreement sometimes applied to enforcement issues in CIS
countries is the 1993 Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family
and Criminal Matters (1993 Minsk Convention).54 This convention, however, makes ref-
erence to arbitration, and only provides for legal assistance by courts of one country to
47. Convention on the Procedure of Settling Disputes Connected with Economic Activity (1992 Kiev
Agreement), Russ.-Ulcr., Mar. 20, 1992.
48. 1992 Kiev Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 7.
49. Id. art. 4.3.
50. Id. art. 4.4.
51. Russia's and Ukraine's respective laws on International Commercial Arbitration do not limit the term
"treteyski" to domestic arbitration.
52. Arbitrazh Court of Krasnodar Region, Case No. ?-32-5202/2007-17/103 (July 2, 2007).
53. Russians Think Old Duopoly Is Eroding, 3 GLOBAL ARB. RIv. 9 (2008).
54. 1993 Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Matters,
Commonwealth of Independent States, Jan. 22, 1993 [hereinafter 1993 Minsk Convention].
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another. The reference to courts in the convention is phrased in such a manner that
makes clear that only the courts as an organ of the state (rather than international arbitral
tribunals) are covered by the definition. Moreover, the provisions related to enforcement
of decisions are limited to decisions of official judicial organs in criminal, civil, and family
matters.55 These agreements should therefore in principle, have no relevance to the en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards.
In sum, none of the international treaties to which the Russian Federation and Ukraine
are a party appear to impose any requirements that contradict, or even appreciably mod-
ify, the terms of the New York Convention. It would therefore appear that, from the
perspective of international law, there exists no substantial issue with respect to the appli-
cation of the convention in either country.
A. RusSIAN DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
Russian law has several provisions relating to enforcement of international arbitral
awards. Some provisions are found in the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federa-
tion (GPK RF) that goveilns the procedure applicable in the civil courts. Russia, however,
has a dual court system, with arbitrazh (i.e. commercial) courts existing in parallel with the
civil courts. These courts are governed by a different code, namely the Arbitrazh Proce-
dure Code of the Russian Federation (APK RF).56 Because the vast majority of interna-
tional arbitral awards are commercial in nature, it is the APK RF, rather than the GPK
RF, that governs the procedure of enforcement of such awards in the Russian
Federation.5 7
Under Article 239 of the APK RF, enforcement of an arbitration award may be denied
on seven specified grounds, which largely mirror the seven grounds of the New York
Convention. 58 In addition to these standard grounds, Article 239(4) of the APK RF con-
tains a general provision allowing courts to deny enforcement where authorized by "an
international treaty of the Russian Federation and the federal law on international com-
mercial arbitration. ' '5 9 The latter federal law is discussed further below.
With regard to foreign arbitral awards, the APK RF provides a parallel, but distinct,
framework for enforcement. Some of the requirements for enforcement are procedural:
for instance, the party seeking enforcement must present the court with certain specified
documents and information,60 and must make the request for execution within three years
of the effective date of the arbitral award. 61 Assuming compliance with these require-
ments, under Article 241, foreign arbitral awards can be recognized and enforced to the
extent permitted by "an international treaty of the Russian Federation and federal law." 62
Commentators have suggested that the "and" in this context should be read as an "or,"
meaning that either a treaty or a federal law may provide the basis for enforcing a foreign
55. See 1993 Minsk Convention, supra note 54, at art. 51.
56. Budylin, supra note 43, at 1.
57. Id.
58. Arbitrazhno-Protsessualnyi Kodeks [APK] [Code of Arbitration Procedure] art. 239 (Russ.) available at
www.consultant.ru/popular/apkrf/9_38 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
59. Id. art. 239(4).
60. Id. art. 242.
61. Id. art. 242(2).
62. Id. art. 241.
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arbitral award in Russia.63 Furthermore, Article 244(2) specifies that enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award may be denied if the award is contrary to the public order of the
Russian Federation or if denial is authorized by the general provision contained in APK
RF Article 239(4), cited above. 64
Because Article 239(4) expressly refers to enforcement in accordance with the "federal
law on international commercial arbitration," it is important to examine the provisions of
the Russian Federation Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which dates from
1993 and is based on the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 65 Under Article 35 of the law, for-
eign arbitral awards are generally enforceable in the Russian Federation except to the
extent enforcement may be denied under Article 36.66 Article 36, in turn, provides a list of
exceptions to enforcement that are identical to those of the New York Convention. 67
Thus, ultimately it appears that Russian legislation is entirely consistent with New York
Convention, even though this conclusion is by no means apparent from a facial review of
the APK RF.
The fact that Russian law, both domestic and treaty-based, is consistent with the New
York Convention, however, does not guarantee that a foreign arbitral award will necessa-
rily be enforced by the Russian courts in accordance with the convention. Unfortunately,
no comprehensive review of Russian court decisions to assess their compliance with the
New York Convention is possible, because most decisions are not publicly available. At
least one review of available cases, however, has suggested that Russian courts refuse'en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards in approximately one third of these cases, which is
substantially higher than the 10 percent rate considered to be the international average
under the New York Convention. 68
In reviewing Russian case law, it is important to keep in mind that Russia has a civil-law
legal system in which judicial decisions do not have the force of binding precedent. Deci-
sions of the higher arbitrazh courts, particularly the Visshiy Arbitrazhniy Sud (VAS), how-
ever, do carry substantial persuasive force with the lower arhitrazh courts.69 The VAS is
the highest court in the federal arbitrazh court system. The lower arbitrazh courts are
divided into three tiers: first instance, appeal, and "cassation." In addition to decisions,
the VAS occasionally issues non-binding "information letters," in which the court seeks to
summarize and clarify case law in a particular area for the benefit of the lower courts.76
VAS issued a decision on January 22, 2008, in a long-running enforcement dispute be-
tween Joy-Lud Distributors International, Inc. and a Russian oil processing plant. The
court permitted enforcement of an arbitration award despite the existence of a typographi-
cal error in the name of the enforcing party, Joy Lud was spelled without a hyphen, in its
63. See Budylin, supra note 43, at 2.
64. APK, supra note 58, at art. 239(4).
65. Id.
66. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, art. 35 (1985).
67. Id. art. 36.
68. William R. Spiegelberger, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Russia: An Analysis of the Rele-
vant Treaties, Laws and Cases, 16 AM. REv. OF INT'L ARB. 261, 262 (2005).
69. Budylin, supra note 43, at 4.
70. Id.
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corporate documents. 71 That such an issue was seriously considered by the court may
strike a foreign reader as odd, but there have been cases in the past where such minor
technical discrepancies resulted in denial of enforcement. 72 This VAS decision therefore
might represent a welcome move towards a more pragmatic view of such discrepancies.
Also in January of 2008, the Federal Arbitration Court of the West Siberian Division
ruled in an enforcement of an arbitration award rendered in Ukraine. 73 The court deter-
mined that there was an unresolved issue of fact as to whether the party against which the
award was rendered was adequately informed of the arbitral proceedings.74 The court
remanded to the lower court to determine whether adequate notice had been given. 75
The court's reasoning does not mention the New York Convention, but relies on parallel
provisions of Article 9 of the 1992 Kiev Agreement, that lists the lack of adequate notice as
a proper ground for refusing to enforce an arbitral award. 76 The court's decision to re-
mand for evidentiary findings on the issue does not therefore appear problematic. Unfor-
tunately, however, the court made no statement as to which party would bear the burden
of proof on remand, even though the New York Convention places the burden of proof on
the party resisting enforcement. 77
Finally, in one of the most recent available cases, published on September 18, 2008, the
Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow Division issued a ruling in favor of OAO Gaz-
prom against OAO Moldovagas, denying the latter's request to enforce an MKAS RF
arbitration award on the ground that the arbitral procedure had not been conducted in
accordance with the parties' agreement.' 8 In its decision, the court relied on Article
V(1)(d) of the New York Convention that allows a court to resist enforcement where the
arbitration procedure was fundamentally flawed. 79 The flaws identified by the court were
that (1) the tribunal issued an award instead of suspending the arbitral proceedings and (2)
the decision did not contain conclusions about the acceptance or rejection of the
presented complaints.8 0 The first of these alleged flaws appears to be a fundamental chal-
lenge to the substantive correctness of the award, rather than the procedure followed by
the tribunal.8' The second flaw is arguably procedural, given the requirement under Arti-
cle 31(2) of Russia's International Arbitration Law that reasons for the award be pro-
vided s2 It is not clear from the court's description whether the award suffered from a
failure to provide reasons or whether it simply failed to address particular arguments
raised by one of the parties. In the latter case, the decision to deny enforcement under the
New York Convention would be far more questionable.
71. Vesmik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF [Vesm. VAS] [The Highest Arbitration Court of the RF
Reporter], Decision No. 5243/06 (Jan. 22, 2008) (unpublished).
72. See generally Spiegelberger, supra note 68 (summarizing publicly available enforcement decisions).
73. Federal Arbitrazh Court of the West Siberian Division, Decision in Case No. F04-338/2008(848-A45-





78. Federal Arbitrazh Court of the Moscow Division, Decision in Case No. KG-A40/8586-08 (Sept. 18,
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Recent enforcement-related decisions of the Russian courts generally recognize the ap-
plicable provisions of the New York Convention and other international enforcement
agreements such as the 1992 Kiev Agreement, but do not apply these principles in a very
consistent or transparent manner. Because Russian court decisions are typically much
shorter and less detailed than those of common law countries (or, for that matter, than a
typical international arbitration award), it is difficult to determine whether the facts of a
particular case fall under one of the exceptions to enforcement under the New York Con-
vention. Nevertheless, some commentators have noted a positive trend towards a greater
degree of enforcement of international arbitral decisions in Russia. It remains to be seen
whether the trend becomes more pronounced and whether the VAS will provide more
effective guidance in its decisions.
B. UKRinIL DOMESTIC LAW AND COURT PRACTICE
Unlike in Russia, where the enforcement of commercial arbitration awards is the prov-
ince of specialized commercial (arbitrazh) courts, in Ukraine recognition and enforcement
is within the province of the courts of general jurisdiction, whose procedure is governed
by Ukraine's Civil Procedure Code (CPK). Although the CPK speaks only refers to en-
forcing decisions of foreign courts, the term can be understood to include foreign arbitral
awards, in accordance with definitions in other domestic legislation, such as Ukraine's
statute on Private International Law.83 This understanding is also confirmed by the Reso-
lution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine issued on December 24, 1999
(SCU Resolution) that clarifies some aspects of Ukrainian court practice with respect to
the enforcement of both foreign court decisions and arbitral awards.8 4
The lack of distinction between the treatment of foreign arbitral awards and court deci-
sions in the domestic legislation, although not necessarily problematic in the CPK, has
resulted in substantial confusion with regard to the application of international treaties.
Thus, courts in Ukraine have not infrequently applied the Minsk Convention (that applies
only to foreign court judgments) to the issue of enforcing foreign arbitral awards, result-
ing in refusals of enforcement on grounds not listed in the New York Convention.85
According to Article 390 of the CPK, a foreign award may be enforced only on the basis
of grounds provided by an applicable international agreement ratified by Ukraine, such as
the New York Convention or a bilateral international agreement.8 6 Furthermore, the
CPK imposes a three-year statute of limitations on the enforcement of foreign awards in
Ukraine, counting from the date of the award.87
In accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 396 of the CPK, enforcement may be refused
in those cases only to the extent permitted by the applicable international agreement.
Paragraph 2 of Article 396 also provides a list of other grounds for refusing enforcement,
83. Serghii Sviriba et al., Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Ukraine, TRANSNAT'L
Disp. MGmT., Vol. 5, No. 3 (2006) at 1.
84. See id.
85. Oleh Beketov & Dmytro Marchukov, Refusing Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in
Ukraine (Procedural Issues and Application of Non-Arbitrability and Public Policy Grounds), TRANSNAT'L DiSp.
MGMT. (Feb. 2008).
86. Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, Law No. 1618-IV (2004) at Art. 396 [hereinafter CPK] available at
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-binAaws/anot.cgi?nreg= 1618-15.
87. Id. art. 391.
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but the list only applies when the international agreement does not identify the permissi-
ble grounds for refusing enforcement.88 Because the New York Convention and the other
international agreements do provide an exhaustive list of grounds for refusing enforce-
ment, the relevance of the grounds stipulated in Paragraph 2 of Article 396 might appear
to be minimal. Efforts to obtain copies and translations of decisions by Ukrainian courts
which appear to be in conflict with the New York Convention, the 1992 Kiev Convention
and the CPK itself have not been successful. Ukraine's domestic legislation on Private
International Law appears to impose some additional requirements for enforcement of
arbitral awards.89 While Article 81.1 of the law explicitly affirms the recognition and
enforcement of international commercial arbitral awards that have entered into force, Ar-
ticle 77 lists a number of subjects involving a "foreign component" with respect to which
Ukraine's courts have exclusive jurisdiction. 90 This legislation implies that an arbitration
award concerning any of the matters listed in Article 77 is outside the permissible scope of
international arbitration as a matter of Ukraine's domestic law91. Consistent with Article
V(2)(a) of the New York Convention, enforcement of an arbitral award involving such
matters could be refused by Ukraine's courts.
The nine types of disputes specifically listed in Article 77 are: (1) disputes over real
property located in Ukraine, (2) family relations between Ukrainian residents; (3) matters
involving inheritance from a resident of Ukraine; (4) disputes over intellectual property
subject to registration in Ukraine; (5) disputes related to the dissolution or liquidation of
foreign legal entities in the territory of Ukraine; (6) disputes related to the validity of
entries in the government register; (7) disputes related to the bankruptcy of a Ukrainian
debtor; (8) cases concerning the issuance of or destruction of commercial paper issued in
Ukraine; and (9) matters related to adoption in Ukrainian territory. 92 As indicated in
Article 77(10), this list of matters is not exhaustive, in that Ukrainian law may prescribe
other matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ukrainian courts.93
The formulations above are capable of a variety of interpretations and, unfortunately,
there has been virtually no guidance from the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding their
application. Consequently, commentators have expressed concern that Ukrainian courts
may take an unduly broad interpretation of the exclusive jurisdiction of Ukrainian
courts.94 For instance, with respect to real property disputes, it would be logical for
Ukrainian courts to have exclusive jurisdiction over issues of title, registration, liens, and
enforcement of property rights. On the other hand, it might be improper for a Ukrainian
court to deny enforcement of an award of monetary damages to a claimant merely because
the arbitration proceeding was connected to immovable property located in Ukraine.95
88. Beketov & Marchukov, supra note 85, at 4.






94. Beketov & Marchukov, supra note 85, at 1.
95. See id.
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Ukraine has also adopted a Law on International Commercial Arbitration (ICA Law),96
which, like the Russian Federation's counterpart, is based the UNCITRAL Model Law of
1985. As such, the grounds for refusing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Article
36.1 coincide almost exactly with those of the New York Convention.
Article 36.1.2 of the ICA Law provides for refusal to enforce decisions of foreign arbi-
tral tribunals if they violate the public policy of Ukraine. 97 This provision deserves partic-
ular attention because it has provided the basis for several recent decisions of Ukrainian
courts. According to Article 228 of the CPK, a private agreement contradicts public pol-
icy if it (1) violates constitutional and human rights or freedoms or (2) destroys, causes
harm to, or unlawfully takes control of the property of an individual, legal entity or the
state. 98 Furthermore, the SCU Resolution mentioned above states that, for purposes of
enforcement of foreign judgments and awards, public policy is to be understood as the
legal order of Ukraine and its governing principles such as sovereignty, integrity, and
independence of the State as well as respect for basic human rights and freedoms.99
Although only a few Ukrainian court decisions on the subject are available for public
review, it appears that Ukrainian courts have relied particularly on the public policy ex-
ception to refuse enforcement of arbitral awards that are inconsistent with decisions of
Ukrainian courts. 100 This trend has continued recently with a well-publicized decision of
a Kiev district court on October 5, 2007, to refuse enforcement of an arbitral award ren-
dered in New York in the wide-ranging dispute between Telenor Mobile Communications
AS and Storm LLC (a subsidiary of Altimo, part of Russia's Alfa Group), the principal
shareholders of Ukrainian cellular carrier Kyivstar.10'
According to publicly available materials, the two shareholders sought to pursue their
claims in different fora. 10 2 Telenor brought claims against Storm on the basis of a share-
holders' agreement providing for international arbitration with a seat in New York as the
means of resolving the parties' dispute. Storm, on the other hand, sought and succeeded
to have the shareholders' agreement and the arbitration clause declared null and void by a
Ukrainian court and obtained an injunction, also from a Ukrainian court, prohibiting the
parties from participating in the international arbitration proceeding. When the arbitra-
tion tribunal, undeterred by the rulings of the Ukrainian courts, whose impartiality it
questioned, proceeded to issue a ruling requiring Storm to divest its shares in Kyivstar to
entities unrelated to Altimo or the affiliated Alfa Group, Ukrainian courts, perhaps unsur-
prisingly, refused to enforce it.10 3
Interestingly enough, however, in refusing enforcement, the Ukrainian court apparently
did not rely on New York Convention Article V(l)(a), which allows a court to refuse
enforcement based on an invalidity of the arbitration clause, or Article V(1)(d), which
permits a denial of enforcement in case of procedural irregularities. Instead, the court
96. Law of Ukraine on International Commercial Arbitration, No. 4002-XII (Feb. 24, 1994) available at
http://www.ucci.org.ua/enlegalbase/zua944002.html.
97. Id. art. 36.1.2.
98. CPK, supra note 86, at art. 228.
99. See Sviriba, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 83.
100. Beketov & Marchukov, supra note 85, at 14-16.
101. Aleksandr Ivanov, Ukrainian Court Defeated New York Arbitration, ZERALo NEDELI, No. 40 (669) (Oct.
27 - Nov. 2, 2007), available at www.zn.ua/2000/2675/60895.
102. See e.g., Telenor v. Altimo, 587 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
103. Ivanov, supra note 101.
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seized on the public policy exception to enforcement corresponding to the New York
Convention Article V(2).104 The court found at least two distinct reasons why enforcing
the award would violate Ukrainian public policy. First, it held that enforcing a decision
requiring alienation of shares in an enterprise violates fundamental norms of property
ownership. 105 Second, it found that the decision was contrary to existing decisions of
Ukrainian courts and that it was therefore contrary to Ukrainian law to enforce it.106
Both of the court's reasons are at least questionable under the narrow reading of the
public policy exception under the New York Convention commonly accepted in the
United States and other Western nations. Indeed, a New York court had little difficulty in
recognizing and enforcing the very same arbitral award less than a month after the above-
mentioned decision.' 07 Moreover, in the latest development in the Telenor-Altimo dis-
pute, on November 18, 2008, the U.S. Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York imposed sanctions against Altimo for failing to comply with the award and
declared several related opinions by Ukrainian courts to be "nothing more than a sham, a
pseudo-legal excuse for Storm and the Altimo Entities to refuse to do what they have all
along refused to do."' 08
As it happens, the particular decision to invalidate Telenor's arbitral award appears con-
sistent with the trend in Ukrainian court decisions that tend to read the public policy
exception in a fairly broad manner, particularly where the award is thought to conflict
with Ukrainian court decisions or proceedings. 10 9 To be fair, changing court practice to
be more consistent with international norms is probably not a task for the lower courts.
Rather, leadership must come from the Supreme Court of Ukraine and the political, busi-
ness, and academic establishments, which have an interest in enhancing the image of
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